This paper takes a broad look at tax expenditures in the context of revenue raising tax reform. It first reviews how tax expenditures have changed over the past 25 years and provides estimates of the distribution of tax savings resulting from tax expenditures today. The paper then examines three comprehensive approaches for applying across-the-board limits to a selected group of the largest and most widely utilized tax preferences. The three options-a fixed percentage credit, a cap based on income, and a constant percentage reduction-can all be designed to raise significant revenue for deficit reduction. While the effects of the options vary across the income distribution and depend on the types of tax expenditures subject to the limitations, variants of all three options can be designed to be progressive in the sense that the limits would reduce after-tax income for higher income taxpayers by more than they would reduce incomes of lower-income taxpayers.
are subtracted in calculating adjusted gross income (AGI)-reduce taxable income and temporary provisions have been aimed at stimulating the economy. The growth of tax expenditures has eroded the tax base, complicated our tax system, and cut revenue substantially. This paper takes a broad look at tax expenditures in the context of tax reform and increasing revenue. It first reviews how tax expenditures have changed over the past 25 years and provides estimates of the distribution of tax savings resulting from tax expenditures today.
The paper then examines three comprehensive approaches for reducing the impact of tax expenditures: replacing current provisions with fixed-rate tax credits, limiting the value of tax expenditures as a share of income, and simply trimming the value of tax expenditures taxpayers may claim. The three approaches would have markedly different effects on households and the impact of each would vary substantially across the income distribution.
The Recent History of Tax Expenditures 1
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) sharply reduced tax expenditures, in part by removing them from the tax code and in part by cutting tax rates and hence reducing their value. 2 In 1985, tax expenditures reported in the federal budget totaled nearly 9 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
3 Three years later, after TRA86 had taken full effect, tax expenditures totaled just 6 percent of GDP ( Figure 1 ). They remained at roughly that level for a decade before climbing steadily to nearly 8 percent of GDP in 2003. Since then, they have fluctuated around 7 percent of GDP as the state of the economy has varied and Congress has enacted short-term 1 This discussion of the history of tax expenditures draws heavily from Rogers and Toder (2011) . 2 Neubig and Joulfaian (1988) find that forty percent of the reduction in the value of tax expenditures from TRA86 was attributable to base broadening, while the remaining sixty percent was due to lower tax rates. 3 The Office of Tax Analysis in the U.S. Department of the Treasury estimates the value of tax expenditures in the federal income tax each year for the Office of Management and Budget. Historical tables in the annual Budget of the United States report those estimates for the two previous fiscal years and the next five years. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) prepares similar estimates for Congress. Unless otherwise noted, we use the Treasury estimates throughout this paper.
stimulus provisions. 4 Tax expenditures are projected to rise over the next few years under the assumptions that temporary tax laws expire as scheduled and the economy recovers from recession. They shrank further over the next three years and have remained roughly constant at about 0.8 percent of GDP since then. Personal tax expenditures dropped by about a quarter after TRA86-from 6.7 percent of GDP in 1985 to 5 percent in 1988-but rose fairly steadily over the next two 4 OMB and JCT estimate each tax expenditure as if all other tax expenditure provisions were in place, so tax expenditures are not strictly additive. Toder and Baneman (2012) estimate that the revenue loss of most individual tax expenditures estimated simultaneously is about 10 percent higher than the cost of adding up the separate estimates for each of those provisions. 5 Business tax expenditures include those in the corporate income tax as well as provisions in the individual income tax that affect business income reported on schedules C (business income), E (partnership income), and F (farm income).
decades to 6.9 percent of GDP in 2003. They have subsequently fallen to about 6 percent of GDP and fluctuated around that level ever since. Deferrals allow taxpayers to delay recognition of current income to a future year.
For example, small businesses may deduct the cost of qualifying investments immediately rather than over time based on economic depreciation. Individuals may choose to defer tax on retirement savings until they withdraw funds. TRA86 cut tax expenditures from deferral by a third from 2.7 percent of GDP in 1985 to 1.8 percent in 1988. They stayed at roughly that level for more than a decade before falling below 1.5 percent of GDP in recent years.
Exclusions leave income from specific sources out of the income tax base. For example, employer contributions to health insurance plans and interest paid on most state and municipal bonds are excluded from taxable income of employees and bondholders. The cost of exclusions has risen gradually over the past few decades from 2.0 percent of GDP in 1985 to 2.4 percent in 2010. That increase has resulted in large part from increases in health care costs, which have driven up the share of employee compensation coming from tax-free employer-paid health insurance premiums. Rogers and Toder (2011). share of all tax expenditures rose correspondingly from a negligible share in 1985 to 10 percent in 2010.
Despite significant variation over the years, tax expenditures impose substantial costs on the federal budget and will continue to do so. In 2011, they were projected to cut revenues and raise outlays by $1.1 trillion, more than we collected from individual income taxes and nearly half of total federal revenue collections for the year.
Who Benefits from Tax Expenditures?
In 2011, we estimate that tax expenditures saved households an average of about $6,500 in reduced taxes. Those savings went to households throughout the income distribution, but the non-refundable credits, and 6) refundable credits. Lower tax rates on capital gains and dividends, itemized deductions, and exclusions primarily benefit households in the top income quintile.
Above-the-line deductions and non-refundable credits provide the largest benefits to taxpayers in the middle three quintiles of the distribution. Refundable credits provide the largest benefits as a share of income to taxpayers in the bottom two quintiles (although the child credit also provides substantial benefits to households in the third and fourth quintiles). The preferential rates substantially reduce the effective tax rates paid by people who get much of their income from gains and dividends. In 2011, the effective individual income tax rate (ETR) for taxpayers with cash income over $1 million was 18.7 percent. People in that income category who got at least two-thirds of their income from long-term capital gains and qualified dividends, however, faced an ETR of just 11.9 percent, compared with an ETR of 22.6 percent for those who got less than a tenth of their income from those sources. 
Capital Gains and

Exclusions from AGI.
8 Income from particular sources is excluded from adjusted gross income and therefore goes untaxed. Important exclusions include employer-paid health insurance benefits, a portion of Social Security benefits, interest paid on bonds issued by state and local governments, and the first $92,900 of foreign-sourced earnings in 2011.
About two-thirds of the tax savings from exclusions benefit tax units in the top income quintile, largely because they face higher tax rates.
Above-the-Line Deductions. Taxpayers who claim the standard deduction rather than itemizing may still benefit from some deductions that they can use to reduce their AGI.
"Above-the-line" deductions include a broad array of expenses, ranging from the first $250 of classroom expenses paid by educators and interest paid on student loans to tuition and fees for post-secondary education. In 2011, less than half of these deductions-but just over half of the tax savings they provide-went to people in the top income quintile. But savings as a share of income were highest for taxpayers in the middle 60 percent of the distribution.
Non-Refundable and Refundable Tax Credits. Tax credits differ from other tax expenditures in that their tax savings are independent of tax rates. The $1,000 child credit, for example, is the same for all eligible families. 9 Credits do differ, however, in whether they are refundable-that is, whether tax filers can claim credits in excess of their basic tax liability. Most credits are not refundable; they can only zero out a person's tax bill. In contrast, refundable credits can result in payments to tax filers who would otherwise have no income tax liability. The child credit, the earned income tax credit, the American Opportunity tax credit, and a few other small credits are refundable.
Tax credits, particularly refundable ones, provide relatively more benefits to low-and middle-income tax units than do other tax expenditures. Over two-thirds of non-refundable credits and more than 90 percent of refundable ones went to households in the bottom four quintiles in 2011. Taxpayers in the bottom quintile got less than 4 percent of pretax income but received about 20 percent of the benefit of refundable credits. In contrast taxpayers in the 2 nd quintile received less than 9 percent of pretax income but almost 40 percent of the benefit from refundable credits. Taxpayers in the top 0.1 percent get virtually no benefit from refundable credits, primarily because those credits generally phase out at higher levels of AGI. 
Limiting Tax Expenditures
The complexity created by tax expenditures, the unequal benefits they provide to taxpayers, and the resulting revenue loss all provide strong arguments for curtailing or eliminating them. President George W. Bush's 2005 tax commission proposed sharply constraining tax expenditures. President Obama's fiscal commission considered complete elimination of all tax expenditures as a way to simplify the tax code, lower rates, and provide additional revenue. And most economists argue that cutting tax expenditures to broaden the tax base and lowering tax rates would yield a more efficient tax system.
But cutting back on tax expenditures is politically difficult. Taxpayers who benefit from specific tax preferences have a strong interest in maintaining them. Politicians hesitate to eliminate or even pare back popular tax provisions. For example, President Obama's repeated proposal to limit the value of itemized deductions to 28 percent brought quick condemnation from both the real estate industry and the philanthropic sector, which worried about the impact of reducing the tax savings from deducting mortgage interest and charitable contributions. Although interest groups would almost certainly levy similar objections to any similar broad reduction, reforming tax expenditures through across-the-board cuts-possibly accompanied by substantial marginal rate cuts-may stand a better chance of legislative success than attacking specific provisions one by one.
In this section, we simulate the effects of three broad approaches to limiting tax expenditures. The first would substitute non-refundable credits for some deductions and exclusions, making the subsidy rate of tax expenditures the same in all marginal rate brackets.
The second would place an overall limit on the tax savings any taxpayers can receive from a selected group of tax expenditure provisions. The third would scale back certain deductions, credits, and exemptions by a fixed proportional amount.
Methodology
We include six tax expenditures in our benchmark simulations:
Exclusion for employer-sponsored health insurance. Premiums paid for employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) are not included in taxable compensation and therefore not taxed under the federal income tax.
11 11 The estimates of the excluded amounts used in our analysis include the portion of health insurance premiums paid by employees under section 125 cafeteria plans, which are treated as employer contributions. Employersponsored health insurance premiums are also excluded from Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes. The simulations presented here do not alter any tax preferences for payroll tax purposes. Under current law, beginning in 2013, dividends will be taxed as ordinary income at rates up to 39.6 percent and long-term capital gains will be subject to a maximum rate of 20 percent. The PPACA will impose an additional surtax of 3.8 percent on dividends and capital gains of high income taxpayers, beginning in 2013.
These six tax expenditures represent nearly 40 percent of the total sum of all tax expenditures as defined in the annual Budget. The employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) exclusion is the largest single income tax expenditure, reducing revenues by nearly $174 billion in 2011. The mortgage interest deduction is the next largest ($89 billion) and the deductions for charitable contributions and state/local taxes paid, along with preferential rates on capital gains and qualified dividends, all easily rank in the top ten according to OMB estimates.
Proposals to Limit Tax Expenditures
We examine three approaches for reducing the revenue cost of tax expenditures in the federal individual income tax by limiting the overall value of the selected provisions listed above rather than reducing or eliminating specific preferences. The first would replace the selected tax expenditures with a non-refundable credit, the second would limit the value of the tax expenditures to a percentage of a taxpayer's income, and the third would impose an equal percentage reduction in the value of each of the tax expenditures. We set parameters in each of the options at levels that would result in roughly the same average tax increase in 2011. 14 Consistent with conventional tax expenditure analysis, we treat the standard deduction as part of the normal tax system and therefore not a tax expenditure. In all three options, our simulations allow taxpayers who would otherwise itemize their deductions to claim the standard deduction instead if it results in lower overall tax liability. In addition, our analysis assumes specific behavioral responses to each of the three tax changes. All of the changes in behavior affect our revenue estimates but we incorporate only the first response listed below in our distributional analysis. 15 In particular, we assume that:
Investors adjust their portfolios in response to a limitation on deductible interest by drawing down assets that generate taxable interest income (but not their stock portfolios) and using the proceeds to reduce debt. We include these adjustments in both distributional and revenue estimates.
16
Donors reduce their charitable contributions in proportion to the increase in the net-of-tax price of giving compared with current law. This adjustment affects only our revenue estimates.
Taxpayers reduce both non-gain and capital gains income in response to an increase in marginal tax rates. This adjustment affects only our revenue estimates.
Taxpayers change the amount and timing of their capital gains realizations in response to changes in tax rates. Specifically, they realize more gains ahead of announced increases in the tax on gains and fewer gains once the higher tax rates take effect. They also realize more capital gains permanently in long-run equilibrium, although this permanent response is smaller than the transitory response. This adjustment affects only our revenue estimates.
To provide a fair comparison between the three alternative tax increases, we calibrate each one to cause roughly similar increases in average tax burdens-about $1,050 in 2011.
Because of differences in design and behavioral responses, however, the three options yield different increases in revenue over the ten-year budget period (Table 1 ). The credit option would 15 Incorporating most forms of behavioral response in distributional estimates of tax changes can misrepresent the actual impact of the changes. For example, a reduction in the tax on realized capital gains would likely induce investors to realize more gains, resulting in their paying more tax than if they did not change their investment activity. A large enough increase in realized gains could result in their paying more total tax and thus appearing to be worse off, despite the fact that a lower tax rate would make them unambiguously better off. Ignoring behavioral change in analyzing the distributional effects thus yields more accurate conclusions. 16 This response leaves taxpayers' net worth unchanged, but allows them to reduce their tax liability by eliminating the use of non-deductible interest payments to finance holdings of assets that generate taxable income.
bring in nearly $2.8 trillion in added revenue over this period, compared with $2.4 trillion for the haircut and AGI limit. The main reason for this difference is the various tax provisions that are scheduled to expire under current law, in particular scheduled increases in marginal tax brackets that cause the 15 percent credit option to reduce the subsidy from deductions and exemptions by more after 2012 than in 2011 and 2012. Some differences in the timing of behavioral responses, especially with respect to capital gains realizations, also lead to revenue differences. 
Proposal Calendar Year
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0411-2).
(1) Proposals are effective 01/01/12. Estimates include a microdynamic behavioral response and assume that taxpayers shift the timing of capital gains realizations in anticipation of a change in the capital gains tax rate. Estimates also assume that taxpayers adjust their investment portfolio and optimally pay down their mortgage balance if their tax benefit from mortgage interest is reduced. Finally, estimates assume that taxpayers adjust charitable contributions in proportion to the change in the tax price of giving compared with current law.
Results
Distributional Effects
By design, all three proposals would have roughly similar effects on the average taxpayer in 2011. Each would increase the average federal tax rate that year by 1.6 percentage points from 18.1 to 19.7 percent of pretax income ( Table 2) . As a result, each would reduce after-tax income by an average of just under 2 percent. The similarities end there, however. The AGI limit would affect the fewest households-just one in three-but would impose the largest tax increases on those with the highest incomes. In contrast, the 39 percent haircut would raise taxes for 54 percent of all tax units. The 15 percent credit would increase taxes for nearly 40 percent of households but would also cut taxes for 5 percent of them because the credit would generate larger tax savings than they currently get from the deductions affected by the proposal. 
Pct of Tax Units
(1) Includes both filing and non-filing units but excludes those that are dependents of other tax units.
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0411-2).
(2) After-tax income is cash income less: individual income tax net of refundable credits; corporate income tax; payroll taxes (Social Security and Medicare); and estate tax. The effects of the three proposals would differ across the income distribution. Relatively few people in the lowest quintile would experience a tax increase under any of the options, reflecting the fact that they benefit little from the tax expenditures the proposals would affect (Table 3 ). In contrast, both the 15 percent credit and the 39 percent haircut would increase taxes for more than 90 percent of people in the top income quintile while the AGI limit would raise taxes for just 75 percent of tax units in that quintile, largely because many high-income taxpayers have large enough AGI to keep the limit from binding.
Although the three proposals would generate roughly equal average tax increases, the tax rise for affected tax units would be largest for the AGI limit and smallest for the haircut. The AGI limit would boost tax bills by an average of more than $3,100 in 2011 for the one-third of tax units whose taxes would go up. In contrast, the 15 percent credit would raise 2011 taxes by an average of nearly $2,800 and the haircut would increase them an average of less than $2,000 for tax units experiencing a tax increase. Those different effects are magnified at the top of the income distribution: affected tax units in the top quintile would see their 2011 tax bills go up by an average of more than $7,500 under the AGI limit, compared with about $6,000 for the 15 percent credit and just over $5,200 for the haircut. All three proposals would be moderately but unevenly progressive across the income distribution. Tax units in the bottom four quintiles would see their after-tax income in 2011 drop by less than average while those in the top quintile would experience larger than average declines (Table 4 and Figure 7 ). For example, the 15 percent credit would reduce after-tax income by about 1 percent for those in the middle three quintiles (and just 0.2 percent for the lowest quintile), compared with a 2 percent overall average reduction and a 2.8 percent reduction in income for the top quintile. Similar patterns hold for the other two proposals.
Under any of the three proposals, taxes would rise much more, relative to income, for taxpayers in the top 0.1 percent. Their after-tax income would drop an average of about 4 percent under either the credit or haircut options and by nearly twice that much under the AGI limit. The size of their tax increases reflects the fact that the tax expenditures included in the options increase their after-tax income relatively more than they raise after-tax income for people further down the income distribution. (1) Includes both filing and non-filing units but excludes those that are dependents of other tax units. Tax units with negative cash income are excluded from the lowest income class but are included in the totals. 
Percent
Alternative Specifications
Itemized deductions and the employer health insurance exclusion affect a relatively large number of taxpayers. In contrast, other tax expenditures, such as the preferential tax rates for long-term capital gains and qualified dividends and the child tax credit (CTC), provide significant benefits to specific groups of taxpayers-investors and families with children, respectively. For example, very high income taxpayers receive most of the benefit from preferential rates for gains and dividends, but almost none of the benefit from the child credit, which phases out at higher levels of AGI. To examine the distributional effects of protecting those tax expenditures from our three proposals, we analyzed two sets of alternatives: one that removes the preferential rates and another that includes the child tax credit. In each case, we used the 15 percent credit option as a benchmark against which to calibrate the AGI limit and haircut options so that all three result in roughly similar average tax increases in 2011.
Retaining Preferential Tax Rates for Long-Term Capital Gains and Qualified Dividends.
If we retain the current tax expenditures for capital gains and dividends, the 15 percent credit would raise average tax liability by nearly $980, about 7 percent less than the $1,050 increase for our base proposal (Table 5) . Making the other two proposals roughly match that average tax increase while retaining the preference for capital gains and dividends required changing their parameters-reducing the AGI limit from 3.9 percent to 2.5 percent and increasing the haircut from 39 percent to 46 percent.
Both the credit and haircut options would increase tax burdens on about the same fractions of taxpayers as our base option-just under 40 percent for the credit and about 54 percent for the haircut. The lower AGI limit, however, would raise taxes burdens for nearly a third more taxpayers-44 percent compared with 34 percent for the base option. That increase, combined with the lower revenue gain for all three options under this variant, yields a much smaller average tax increase for affected taxpayers: just under $2,200 compared with more than $3,100 for the base case. 
Pct of Tax
Avg Tax Increase ($)
(2) After-tax income is cash income less: individual income tax net of refundable credits; corporate income tax; payroll taxes (Social Security and Medicare); and estate tax. Exempting capital gains and dividends from cuts in tax expenditures mostly benefits higher-income taxpayers, who receive the lion's share of income from those sources (Table 6 ).
That is particularly true for the AGI limit, which would boost taxes for only half of taxpayers in the top 0.1 percent compared with the two-thirds affected by our base option. The AGI limit would affect additional middle-income households-for example, more than half of those in the middle quintile would pay more tax under this version compared with 40 percent under the base option. Average tax increases differ much more, however, than the number of tax units affected.
The AGI limit would raise taxes for affected taxpayers in the top 1 percent by an average of about $24,000 if gains and dividends retain their tax advantage, compared with over $84,000 when the capital gains and dividends preferences are subject to the limit.
Omitting gains and dividends from the proposals has a smaller effect on the number of tax units affected by the credit and haircut options than the number affected by the 15 percent credit, but high-income taxpayers would see their taxes rise much less with gains and dividends excluded under these options as well. For example, people in the top 1 percent affected by the changes would see their taxes rise an average of just over $21,000 for the credit option with gains and dividends excluded, compared with about $35,000 when the limits apply to the gains and dividends preferences. Comparable estimates for the haircut option are $16,000 and $36,000, respectively. These differences reflect the fact that high-income households receive most capital gains and dividends and would thus benefit most from continuing the preferential tax treatment of income from those sources.
Exempting gains and dividends from the three proposals reduces or undoes the progressivity of the tax increases, particularly at the top of the income distribution (Table 7) . On average, for example, the AGI limit would then reduce after-tax income by 1.8 percent for all tax units but only by 1.4 percent for those in the top 1 percent. Similarly, it would boost tax rates by 1.5 percent on average but by only 1 percent for the top percentile. The haircut option would have similar effects, while the 15 percent credit would affect those with the highest incomes about the same as the overall average. Of the three options, the 15 percent credit would have the largest adverse effect on tax units with the highest incomes and the smallest impact on households in the 40 th -80 th percentile range. In contrast, the AGI limit and haircut options would affect these middle and upper-middle income taxpayers more. (1) Includes both filing and non-filing units but excludes those that are dependents of other tax units.Tax units with negative cash income are excluded from the lowest income class but are included in the totals. Including the child tax credit.
Including the child tax credit (CTC) in the base of tax expenditures subject to limitation would increase the impact of the AGI limit and haircut proposals on tax units in the lower quintiles while imposing smaller tax increases on those with the highest incomes. 18 This results primarily from the higher AGI limit (4.8 percent compared with 3.9 percent for the base option) and the smaller haircut (35 percent versus 39 percent for the base option) required to generate the same average effect on tax units. As was the case for the base option, those parameters would increase taxes by an average of around $1,050 in 2011 ( Compared with our base option, the AGI limit on preferences including the CTC would raise taxes by a larger amount and for more tax units in the bottom two quintiles and raise less from fewer taxpayers in the top two quintiles (Table 9 ). For example, 31 percent of those in the second quintile would see their taxes rise by an average of nearly $830, compared with 20 percent facing an average tax increase of just $400 under the base case. This reflects the fact that the CTC makes up a larger share of tax expenditures for low-income families than for those in the higher quintiles (many of whom receive no benefit from the credit because it phases out at higher levels of AGI) and the fact that the base option set a lower AGI limit. The same pattern occurs for the 35 percent haircut, but for that option the difference in tax changes in the bottom quintiles from including or excluding the child credit is smaller.
Including the child credit makes both the AGI limit and haircut options less progressive, increasing the tax increases on lower-income tax units and decreasing those on high-income households compared with the tax changes they would face for comparable limits that exclude the child credit (Tables 4 and 10 (1) Includes both filing and non-filing units but excludes those that are dependents of other tax units. Tax units with negative cash income are excluded from the lowest income class but included in the totals. 
Conclusions
Compelling economic and political reasons make tax expenditures a logical area to focus future efforts at deficit-reducing tax reform. While an ideal tax reform process would comprehensively evaluate each tax expenditure on its merits, eliminating some and restructuring or retaining others, broad-based limitations on tax expenditures may be easier to enact and would still produce net benefits. This paper examines alternatives for implementing across-the-board limits applied to a selected group of the largest and most widely utilized tax preferences. The three options-a fixed percentage credit, a cap based on income, and a constant percentage reduction-can all be designed to raise significant revenue for deficit reduction. The effects of the options vary across the income distribution and depend on the types of tax expenditures subject to the limitations. But variants of all three options can be designed to be progressive in the sense that the limits would reduce after-tax income for higher income taxpayers by more than they would reduce incomes of lower-income taxpayers.
